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THE PROPER BORDERS OF PADILLA:
COURTS MUST AVOID OVER-EXPANSION
OF SIXTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
TERRENCE REGAN†
INTRODUCTION
You have nothing to worry about. Relying on his attorney’s
advice, Jose Padilla decided to plead guilty to felony drug
trafficking in Hardin County Circuit Court, in Hardin County,
Kentucky.1 As recommended in his plea agreement, Padilla was
sentenced to serve a five-year prison term, followed by five years
on probation.2 Padilla elected to take the certainty of the
bargained-for sentence, rather than take his chances in front of a
jury.3
You’ve been in the country so long, you won’t get deported.
Jose Padilla came to the United States in the 1960s after being
born in Honduras in 1950.4 He became a lawful permanent
†
Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John’s
University School of Law; A.B., 2009, College of the Holy Cross. I would like to
thank my parents and the rest of my family and friends for their encouragement and
support.
1
Brief for Petitioner at 2, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651).
2
Id. at 9.
3
The brief for the petitioner describes this as only a “meager benefit.” Id. at 10.
The brief goes on to describe the possible consequences had Padilla decided to go to
trial:
Had Padilla gone to trial, he would not only have forced the Commonwealth
to its proof of guilt by a reasonable doubt, but he also would have been
entitled to request jury sentencing (and to present mitigating sentencing
evidence). He may have received a substantially lower sentence than ten
years, perhaps the minimum of five years. In any event, he would have
been parole eligible after serving 20% of his sentence. Thus, even if he had
gone to trial and received the maximum sentence of ten years, he would
have been eligible for parole within approximately a year from conviction
(given his credit of 365 days for time served). Padilla nonetheless chose to
accept the certainty of a five year term of imprisonment with five years
probated.
Id. (citations omitted).
4
Id. at 8.
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resident and served honorably in Vietnam.5 At the time of his
arrest in 2001, he lived with his family in California and worked
as a licensed commercial truck driver.6
But Padilla did have something to worry about. He could—
and almost certainly would—get deported.
Under federal
immigration law, “Any alien who . . . has been convicted of a
violation
of . . . any
law . . . relating
to
a
controlled
substance . . . is deportable.”7
As discussed below, the
development of immigration law in the last half century has
made deportation a near-automatic result for aliens convicted of
felonies.8 This is especially true when the conviction is for a drug
crime.9 Padilla’s only remaining avenue for relief was to seek to
vacate his guilty plea through a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, for his attorney’s failure to warn him about deportation
consequences. This laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court
to re-evaluate its existing ineffective assistance doctrine as well
as the application of that doctrine in the lower state and federal
courts.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that Padilla’s attorney
had failed to render effective assistance of counsel by misadvising
Padilla about the deportation consequences of his guilty plea.10
Explicitly, the Court’s holding was narrow: A criminal defense
attorney has the duty to provide accurate advice regarding
deportation to a noncitizen client.11 Implicitly, however, the
Court caused a major shake-up in Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence by undermining the longstanding direct-collateral
consequences doctrine followed by lower courts.12 With the
longstanding doctrine seemingly marginalized, courts hearing
ineffective assistance claims were thrust into a state of flux.
Though it was clear that a criminal defense attorney now had to
advise his client about deportation, there were no clear directives
for when guilty pleas were challenged based on failed advice
regarding other “collateral” consequences.
5

Id.
Id.
7
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (emphasis added).
8
See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
9
See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 362–63 nn.4–5.
10
Id. at 368–69.
11
Id. at 364.
12
The Court noted that it had never endorsed the direct-collateral doctrine as a
part of Sixth Amendment analysis. Id. at 364 n.8, 365.
6
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This Note proposes a new method of Sixth Amendment
analysis. This analysis is consistent with the Court’s decision in
Padilla v. Kentucky and its other Sixth Amendment precedent.
It also responds to concerns that criminal defendants are treated
fairly, on the one hand, and that the criminal justice system is
not overburdened by an undermined plea system, on the other.
This Note argues that the focus of the “competence prong” of the
ineffective assistance test must be focused on the attorney’s
knowledge and his action in relation to that knowledge. When an
attorney knows—or reasonably should know—that a collateral
consequence is looming over his client’s conviction, the Supreme
Court, this Note, and common sense demand that the attorney
advise his client on the matter.
Part I of the Note reviews the development of Sixth
Amendment doctrine that established the right of an indigent
defendant to be provided with counsel at trial, as well as at other
stages of a criminal proceeding where his rights could be
substantially affected. Part I next notes the Court’s recognition
that the Sixth Amendment not only protects a defendant’s right
to have counsel present, but also requires that the counsel be
effective. This Part then looks at the current doctrine for claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, which are governed by the
1972 Supreme Court case, Strickland v. Washington. This
section reviews the two-pronged test established by the
Strickland Court for resolving defendants’ motions for postconviction relief. Part I concludes with a review of the direct and
collateral consequences doctrine, which has been created and
employed by lower courts to determine the applicability of
Strickland in cases where the advice of counsel—or lack
thereof—is at issue.
Part II of this Note identifies the traditional problems with
the direct-collateral doctrine and will argue that lower courts
applying Padilla have not cured these defects in Sixth
Amendment law. Part II.A discusses the problems inherent in
defining “direct” and “collateral” consequences. Part II.B then
discusses the policy considerations at stake in Sixth Amendment
cases. Finally, Part II.C reviews the three basic applications of
Padilla to the direct-collateral doctrine and will argue that none
of these approaches are satisfactory.
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This Note concludes in Part III by proposing a new method of
Sixth Amendment analysis that focuses on attorney knowledge.
This proposed method is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
holdings in Padilla and Strickland and addresses the competing
public policy concerns over fairness to criminal defendants and
the institutional “floodgates” concern.
First, Part III, using language from Padilla, identifies which
consequences, like deportation, are “not categorically removed”
from Sixth Amendment relief.13 This section argues that certain
consequences, like deportation and the traditional “direct”
consequences are “not categorically removed,” and thus are
always subject to ineffective assistance claims. This section also
argues that, though there are other consequences which may also
fall in this category, courts should be hesitant to expand this
category too far.
Part III next identifies circumstances in which any
consequence—direct or collateral—should be subject to claims for
ineffective assistance. All of these circumstances have, at their
foundation, a basis to conclude that the attorney had some
knowledge of the consequence and yet failed to act as an effective
advocate. The first, and clearest, circumstance is affirmative
misadvice. The next circumstance, which is harder to prove, is
when the attorney fails to give any advice, but where there is
evidence that the attorney knew—or should have known—that
the consequence was in play. This section of the Note will
identify potential sources of evidence to show what an attorney
knew or should have known.
I.
A.

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Right to Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment guarantees certain rights to those
who stand accused in criminal prosecutions. Among these
guaranteed rights is the accused’s right to “Assistance of
Counsel.”14
Though this seems to be a straightforward

13

Id. at 366 (“We conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically
removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”).
14
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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proposition, the exact requirements of the Sixth Amendment’s
right to counsel have been subject to much uncertainty and
development throughout this country’s history.
The right to retain private defense counsel has never been
subject to debate, but the extension of the Sixth Amendment
beyond this basic right has been continually developing in the
last eighty years.15 The first major development in the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel came in the Court’s decision in
Powell v. Alabama.16 Relying on the Due Process Clause, the
Court held in Powell that the defendant’s right to a fair trial
required that an indigent defendant be appointed counsel.17
Though the Powell decision was grounded in due process
considerations, six years after Powell, the Court held in Johnson
v. Zerbst18 that the right to appointed counsel, like the right to
privately retained counsel, was properly found in the guarantees
of the Sixth Amendment.19 Though Powell and Johnson were
originally held not to apply to state cases, absent some special
circumstances,20 the guarantee of counsel was eventually
extended to all indigent defendants, regardless of the charges
they faced.21
Though the Powell decision is grounded in concerns that the
defendant receive a fair trial, the Court has held that the
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment extend to other phases of a
criminal prosecution. In Evitts v. Lucey,22 the Court extended
Sixth Amendment protection to a defendant taking a first appeal
from a criminal conviction.23 The Supreme Court has held that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to any part of a
criminal proceeding where the defendant’s rights are
substantially at risk,24 which includes the plea-bargaining phase
of the prosecution.25

15
Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Construction and Application of Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel—Supreme Court Cases, 33 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2009).
16
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
17
Id. at 73.
18
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
19
Id. at 462–63.
20
See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
21
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
22
469 U.S. 387 (1985).
23
Id. at 393–94.
24
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
25
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
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The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

The due process requirement for a fair trial, according to the
Court
in
Powell,
was
not
satisfied
when
“circumstances . . . preclude[d] the giving of effective aid” from
counsel.26 This requirement of effective aid was read into the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel ten years
after Powell, in Glasser v. United States.27 However, neither
Powell nor Glasser established what, if anything, would render
the assistance of counsel, appointed or privately retained,
ineffective.
In certain circumstances, the Court has recognized a strong
presumption of ineffectiveness of counsel, establishing what some
commentators describe as a per se rule.28 One such circumstance
occurs where the state in some way interferes with counsel’s
ability to effectively serve his client.29 The Court has recognized
several different types of state interference as a denial of the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.30
The other circumstance in which the Court has recognized a
strong presumption of ineffectiveness is where an attorney’s
performance is rendered ineffective by some conflict of interest.31
The presumption of ineffectiveness is not quite as strong in this
circumstance as it is when state interference is involved.32 Only
when an attorney “actively represent[s] conflicting interests,”
and such conflict hampers the attorney’s representation of the
defendant, is ineffectiveness presumed.33

26

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (emphasis added).
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
28
See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.7(d) (3d ed. 2011).
29
See id. § 11.8(a).
30
See Geders v. United States¸ 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding that a court
order that an attorney not consult his client during an overnight recess constituted
state interference); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975) (holding that a
statute prohibiting closing argument at a bench trial violated the Sixth
Amendment); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 613 (1972) (holding that a statute
requiring the defendant, if he testified, to be the first defense witness was
unconstitutional); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961) (holding, on Fifth
Amendment grounds, that prohibiting direct examination of a defendant who had
made an unsworn statement violated due process).
31
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 28, § 11.9(a).
32
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
33
Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
27
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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel After Strickland v.
Washington

The Supreme Court did not consider any questions
concerning “actual ineffectiveness”—not including a conflict of
interest34—until 1984.35 In Strickland, the Court held that a
defendant could prevail on a claim of actual ineffectiveness only
by satisfying a two-pronged standard.36 To satisfy Strickland’s
first prong, a defendant must “show that counsel’s performance
was deficient.”37 A court applying this prong may use “prevailing
professional norms,” such as American Bar Association
standards, as “guides” in evaluating an attorney’s representation
of his client.38 The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that such
standards and norms “are only guides” and courts should be
“highly deferential” when scrutinizing an attorney’s strategic
decisions.39
To satisfy Strickland’s second prong, “the defendant must
show that the deficient performance [of counsel] prejudiced the
defense.”40 An error by counsel will not be set aside if the error
did not impact the result of the criminal proceeding.41 The
defendant must also satisfy this second prong, which requires an
affirmative showing that there is a “reasonable probability”42
that the proceeding would have been more favorable to the
defendant without counsel’s errors.43
The focus of the inquiry into the effectiveness of counsel
should be “whether . . . the result of the particular proceeding is
unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process.”44
It is from counsel’s primary role as an advocate for the defendant
in the adversary system that all other duties arise.45 In United
34

See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
36
Id. at 687.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 688.
39
Id. at 688–89.
40
Id. at 687.
41
Id. at 691.
42
Id. at 694 (“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome [of the adversarial proceeding].”).
43
Id. The Court noted that the governing legal standard in the proceeding—
generally, “beyond a reasonable doubt” in a criminal proceeding—serves a “critical
role” in establishing prejudice. Id. at 682, 695.
44
Id. at 696.
45
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655–56 (1984).
35
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States v. Cronic, a companion case to Strickland, the Court
emphasized the importance that counsel act as the defendant’s
advocate, holding that “if the process loses its character as a
confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee
is violated.”46 The Court, in both Strickland and Cronic, used its
emphasis on the adversarial process to dissuade subsequent
decision-makers from turning ineffective assistance claims into
attorney performance reviews.47
D. Direct and Collateral Consequences
In applying Strickland, both federal and state courts have
imported a doctrine used in a related area of law. Under Brady
v. United States,48 a trial court is required to inform a defendant
pleading guilty of the direct consequences of the plea and
resulting sentence.49 By implication, then, due process did not
require that a pleading defendant be advised of consequences
that were merely “collateral” to the pled-to crime.
Though the direct-collateral distinction was created in a
Fifth Amendment case, both federal and state courts began
applying the direct-collateral distinction to Sixth Amendment
cases soon after Brady.50 Despite its widespread use, the
Supreme Court did not consider whether the direct-collateral
distinction was properly being applied to Sixth Amendment cases
until more than forty years after the distinction was created in
Brady.51
When the question finally came before the Court in Padilla
v. Kentucky, the Court’s holding on the matter was very limited.
The Court noted that it had “never applied a distinction between
direct and collateral consequences” in Sixth Amendment
assistance of counsel cases.52 The Court, however, did not take
this opportunity to decide whether the distinction was generally
relevant to Sixth Amendment inquiries.53 Instead, the Court
46

Id. at 656–57.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656–57.
48
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
49
Id. at 755.
50
See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 706–08 (2002).
51
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010).
52
Id. at 365.
53
Id. (“Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not
consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.”).
47
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restrained itself, holding only that “[t]he collateral versus direct
distinction
is . . . ill-suited
to . . . the
specific
risk
of
deportation.”54
The Supreme Court’s holding that deportation was not a
“collateral” consequence was not a complete departure from the
lower courts; to the extent that lower courts realized an exception
to the direct-collateral consequences rule, that exception was
deportation. State courts in Colorado, Indiana, Ohio, Oregon,
and California have all recognized, to some degree, that a
noncitizen defendant may be entitled to the advice of counsel on
the matter.55 An increasing number of state statutes and court
rules have allowed for a deportation exception to the directcollateral consequences rule.56 This exception likely stems from
the formerly recognized duty of an attorney to advise his client as
to the availability of a Judicial Recommendation Against
Deportation (“JRAD”)—a procedure which was eliminated by
statute in 1990.57
The direct-collateral doctrine has been sharply criticized.
Many commentators see collateral consequences as a “secret
sentence.”58
These commentators see the direct-collateral
doctrine as an effective denial of counsel with regard to this
“sentence.”59 Proponents of the distinction, meanwhile, have
their concerns voiced in Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in
Padilla. In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that “[a]dding to
counsel’s duties an obligation to advise about a conviction’s
collateral consequences has no logical stopping-point.”60 The fear
on this side of the debate is that the inclusion of collateral
consequences into an attorney’s duties to advise will overburden
attorneys and courts.61 They also fear that the inclusion will

54

Id. at 366.
Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 708 (noting that some decisions may have
relied on state law, rather than constitutional, grounds).
56
Id.
57
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363.
58
Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 700.
59
Id.
60
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 390 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
61
See Derek Wikstrom, Note, “No Logical Stopping-Point”: The Consequences of
Padilla v. Kentucky’s Inevitable Expansion, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 351, 367–68 (2012).
55
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severely erode the reliability and finality of guilty pleas, upon
which much of the efficient and orderly operation of the criminal
justice system relies.62
II. PADILLA HAS ADDED TO THE EXISTING CONFUSION
SURROUNDING SIXTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS BASED ON ATTORNEY
ADVICE
The direct-collateral doctrine, even before the Court’s
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, suffered from two major
problems. First, application of the doctrine was very uncertain.
The definition of “direct” and “collateral” varied from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction.63 Further, there were some consequences, such as
deportation, which were neither definitively direct nor
definitively collateral.64
Second, both liberal and strict
interpretations of the doctrine posed significant policy concerns.
A liberal application of the direct-collateral doctrine raised
institutional concerns. Courts and commentators rejecting a
liberal application cite the “floodgates concern”—that liberal
application of the direct-collateral doctrine would put almost all
guilty pleas in danger of being vacated on Strickland claims.65
Even if these pleas would not ultimately be vacated, the need to
hold a Strickland hearing would put a tremendous burden on the
criminal justice system.66 Those favoring a liberal approach,
however, argue that any institutional concerns created by the
liberal application are far outweighed by concerns for the
defendant who pled guilty based on his attorney’s
incompetence.67 These courts and commentators argue that the
allure of quick and efficient resolution of cases by plea bargain
can induce defense lawyers, prosecutors, and even judges to
ignore “collateral” consequences that may be of utmost
62

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371.
See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent
Predators”, 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 689–93 (2008).
64
See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences,
Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124–
125 (2009) (stating that while courts considered “direct” consequences to be those
that were penal sanctions, some consequences were labeled as “collateral” even
though they were severe).
65
See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 736.
66
See id. at 736–37.
67
See Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 743
(2011).
63
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importance to the defendant.68 The Sixth Amendment, the
argument continues, is the only way to ensure that every
defendant will have access to information about the potentially
life-altering consequences of his or her plea.69
The Padilla decision has contributed to confusion in this
area. The Court spoke definitively only on deportation; the
extension of its holding was left to speculation and interpretation
by lower courts. Courts applying Padilla have generally followed
one of three different methods. Some courts have read Padilla as
obliterating the distinction between direct and collateral
consequences.70 Others have read Padilla as leaving the directcollateral doctrine untouched, except for a new carve-out for
deportation.71 A third approach that is taken by some courts is to
apply the old direct-collateral doctrine for the time being, holding
that Padilla does not apply retroactively to pleas taken before
the decision was handed down.72
This Part identifies and details the problems inherent in the
direct-collateral doctrine and argues that none of the three
readings of Padilla currently employed by lower courts
adequately address these problems. First, Part II.A discusses
the inconsistent application of the direct-collateral doctrine
before Padilla.
Then, Part II.B discusses the policy
considerations underlying the application of the direct-collateral
doctrine, and argues that the pre-Padilla application failed to
strike a proper balance. Finally, Part II.C demonstrates that the
Padilla decision, as well as its application in subsequent lower
court decisions, failed to correct—and in some cases made
worse—these issues.

68

Paisly Bender, Comment, Exposing the Hidden Penalties of Pleading Guilty: A
Revision of the Collateral Consequences Rule, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 291, 305
(2011).
69
See id. at 304–05.
70
See, e.g., Malia Brink, A Gauntlet Thrown: The Transformative Potential of
Padilla v. Kentucky, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 39, 42 (2011).
71
See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 28 Misc. 3d 575, 579, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696, 699
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2010).
72
See, e.g., Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So. 3d 868, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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Major Problem with the Direct-Collateral Doctrine PrePadilla Was Its Inconsistent Application

The first problem with the direct-collateral doctrine is
inherent in the doctrine itself. The terms “direct” and “collateral”
have seemingly no certain definitions and there is often
significant overlap between the two categories. One of the few
certainties in this area is that the prison sentence and fine
attached to a conviction are “direct” consequences.73 Beyond
these two rather obvious examples, however, there is significant
discrepancy as to what is direct and what is collateral. The D.C.
Circuit acknowledged this problem by noting that “[t]he
distinction between a collateral and a direct consequence of a
criminal conviction, like many of the lines drawn in legal
analysis, is obvious at the extremes and often subtle at the
margin.”74
The problem with the traditional distinction between “direct”
and “collateral” consequences is that the definitions of the two
terms are not perfectly complementary. “Direct” consequences
typically involve only those consequences that concern the
“nature of the sentence” imposed for a crime.75 “Collateral”
consequences, on the other hand, are described as “stem[ming]
from the fact of conviction rather than from the sentence of the
court.”76 Where exactly direct consequences end and collateral
consequences begin varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.77 The
two definitions are best illustrated as a pair of circles in a Venn
diagram. When the definitions are strictly applied, there is no
intersection of the circles, and some consequences will fall into
the void between the circles. When the definitions are liberally
applied, the circles intersect too much, leaving very few
consequences that are purely direct or purely collateral.
Before Padilla, deportation was particularly difficult to
classify as direct or collateral.78 Though most states held that
deportation was merely a collateral consequence, removed from
Sixth Amendment protection, there were several state courts

73
74
75
76
77
78

Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 699.
United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 28, § 21.4(d).
Roberts, supra note 63, at 678 (emphasis added).
Id. at 679–80.
See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 708.
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that had held that a noncitizen defendant had a right to advice
about the deportation consequences of his guilty plea.79 Other
states imposed this right by statute or court rule.80
Part of the difficulty in classifying deportation as collateral
lies in the unique development of deportation law over the course
of the twentieth century. The key development in this area was
the elimination of the JRAD.81 Once available as a means to
mitigate the potential for deportation based on a conviction,
several federal circuits held that a noncitizen defendant who was
not informed about JRAD was entitled to a Sixth Amendment
claim.82 The elimination of JRAD in the early 1990s made
deportation a near-automatic consequence for noncitizen
defendants convicted of a wide range of crimes.83 This change in
the law took deportation entirely out of a judge’s—even a federal
judge’s—hands, which arguably made deportation more
“collateral” than “direct” for the purposes of the Sixth
Amendment.84
However, it was difficult to rationalize
eliminating the protection of the Sixth Amendment when the
change in the law had made the possibility of deportation not
only harsher, but also more predictable.
Though the most “diversity of opinion” regarding the
application of the direct-collateral doctrine came in cases
concerning deportation, there were many other consequences
where the doctrine was far from uniform. Consequences which
could significantly impact the length or manner of imprisonment
were deemed collateral by some courts because the trial court
had minimal power over the consequence.85 Other courts,
however, saw these consequences as affecting the “nature” of the
79

Id.
Id.
81
Adonia R. Simpson, Note, Judicial Recommendations Against Removal: A
Solution to the Problem of Deportation for Statutory Rape, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 489, 502 (2009).
82
See Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 455 (2d Cir. 1986) (requiring a
noncitizen defendant to be advised as to the availability of JRAD procedures).
83
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2010).
84
See id. at 364–65.
85
See Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1548–49 (l1th Cir. 1989) (holding
ineligibility for parole is a collateral consequence); United States v. Rubalcaba, 811
F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a defendant need not be advised that he
was to serve his prison sentences consecutively, rather than concurrently); State v.
Barton, 609 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) (holding that a defendant need
not be advised that he would receive a heightened sentence because he was a repeat
offender).
80
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sentence, and thus were “direct.”86 This category of consequences
acutely exposes the shortcoming of the traditional distinction
between direct and collateral consequences. Though they are
technically closest to the “collateral” definition, they can have an
immediate and severe impact on the “direct” sentence for the
crime.
Another area where courts have differed as to the
availability of Sixth Amendment relief is when the consequences
may have a more profound impact on the defendant’s life than
his sentence might. Deportation may fit in this category, but as a
very extreme example. Similar, if less severe, consequences
include disqualification from public benefits and loss of
professional licenses.87
Many courts held that these
consequences were collateral, as they were both outside the
purview of the criminal court and only tenuously connected to the
“direct” consequences of conviction.88 Other courts have focused
on the fact that these consequences may outweigh the direct
consequences for certain defendants and have held that, in these
circumstances, the defendant should be protected by the Sixth
Amendment.89
Though the direct-collateral doctrine was one of the “most
widely accepted” doctrines among lower courts before Padilla,90
each jurisdiction accepted the doctrine only on its own terms.
Courts struggling to define and distinguish “direct” and
“collateral” doctrines would reach disparate results because they
emphasized different aspects of the doctrine.91 Thus, a court
focused on the unique development of immigration law would
provide Sixth Amendment relief for deportation.92 Meanwhile, a

86

See Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486, 490 (Fla. 1993) (requiring advice about
repeat offender laws); People v. Flannigan, 267 N.E.2d 739, 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971)
(requiring advice that sentences would be served consecutively); State v. Smith, 513
So. 2d 544, 547–49 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (requiring that a defendant be advised about
unavailability of parole).
87
Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 705–06.
88
Id. at 704–05.
89
See id. at 705–06.
90
See id. at 699.
91
Compare People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 336 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that defendant had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his
attorney failed to advise him of immigration consequences), with State v. Smith, 513
So. 2d 544, 547–49 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (finding ineligibility for parole was a direct
consequence).
92
See Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
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jurisdiction more concerned with the true impact of direct
consequences would likely protect a defendant who was
uninformed about the unavailability of parole, mandatory
consecutive sentencing, or heightened sentencing for repeat
offenders.93 Other courts, finding that the relative impact of the
“collateral” consequences was greater than that of the “direct”
consequences, could grant relief for those subject to loss of public
benefits or professional licenses.94
At least one of these
considerations was likely to play a role in any court’s resolution
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, making the “widely
accepted” direct-collateral doctrine diverse and unpredictable
across jurisdictions.
B.

The Direct-Collateral Doctrine Failed To Strike the Proper
Balance Between Institutional Concerns for the Criminal
Justice System and Fairness Considerations for Individual
Defendants

Analysis of Sixth Amendment claims takes on added
significance in the context of guilty pleas. The criminal justice
system relies on guilty pleas to resolve the vast majority of
disputes in the system. Without guilty pleas, there would be
almost no feasible way to handle the tremendous caseload
coming through courthouses in nearly every jurisdiction in the
United States. A liberal application of the Sixth Amendment in
this context potentially subjects all guilty pleas to being
overturned in collateral proceedings.95 If defense attorneys,
prosecutors, and judges could not rely on the finality of pleas
given in open court, the entire system would be crippled. This
would not only hurt the court system, but it would also hurt
defendants seeking to plead guilty. Often, defendants use guilty
pleas to secure favorable dispositions, to avoid having evidence of
their wrongdoing put before a jury, and to ensure a quick
resolution to their encounter with law enforcement.96 However, if
93

See Smith, 513 So. 2d at 547–49.
See, e.g., United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that defendant’s disqualification from public benefits following his
conviction is a direct consequence); see also Barkley v. State, 724 A.2d 558, 560–61
(Del. 1999) (holding that automatic revocation of a driver’s license is a direct
consequence).
95
Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 702.
96
Jerold H. Israel, Excessive Criminal Justice Caseloads: Challenging the
Conventional Wisdom, 48 FLA. L. REV. 761, 774–75 (1996).
94
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institutional concerns over protecting the finality of guilty pleas
are given too much weight, the pleading defendant is put at
significant risk of being blindsided by “collateral” consequences
that would have significantly altered their decision to plead.
1.

Institutional Concerns at Risk in the Guilty Plea Context

Though a jury trial is often thought to be the identifying
characteristic of the American criminal system, the truth is that
criminal trials are becoming increasingly rare. According to the
Department of Justice, over ninety percent of convictions come as
a result of a guilty plea.97 Recognizing the mounting importance
of the plea-bargain regime, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
for a significant number of cases defining the plea process.98
In its decisions on ineffective assistance claims, the Court
has recognized some concerns specific to plea bargains. In Premo
v. Moore,99 the Court noted that the plea bargain system relied on
stability.100 The availability of Sixth Amendment relief injected
instability into this system by subjecting bargained-for
dispositions to judicial second-guessing. If a court failed to
“accord the latitude” granted to counsel under Strickland’s
competence prong, prosecutors could lose faith in the finality of
bargained pleas, leading them to withhold plea offers—“a result
favorable to no one.”101 This instability poses a threat not only to
cases where a guilty plea is ultimately taken, but also to any case
where a guilty plea is offered; this uncertainty would affect
nearly every case that came through the criminal justice
system.102
Extending Sixth Amendment protection to “collateral”
consequences is particularly scary for attorneys and judges in the
criminal system because they will have little, if any, control over
the ultimate resolution of the proceeding producing the
consequence. The Illinois Supreme Court was unsettled by this
prospect, stating that “a criminal court is in no position to advise
97

BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 22,
24 tbl.21 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf.
98
Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From
Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1118–19 (2011).
99
131 S. Ct. 733 (2011).
100
Id. at 741–42.
101
Id. at 742.
102
See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 736.
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on all the ramifications of a guilty plea personal to a
defendant.”103 The Illinois Supreme Court was concerned that
overstating the protection of the Sixth Amendment would leave
the guilty pleas taken in the court system subject to being
vacated by any one of the “numerous” and “logically
unforeseeable” collateral consequences following the conviction.104
2.

Concerns for Fairness to the Defendant Taking the Plea.

Though the plea bargaining system, in theory, should bestow
equal benefits on the state and the defendant, there are
circumstances where an incompetent defense counsel may take
away this “mutuality of advantage.”105 The direct-collateral
doctrine was an attempt to account for this scenario. However,
this distinction rested on the simplistic and sometimes faulty
premise that the “direct” consequences of a conviction were the
most serious for a criminal defendant.106
Whether or not the direct consequences of a conviction
outweigh the collateral consequences is generally a fact-sensitive
inquiry. The relative importance can only be ascertained on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the unique features of the
defendant. For a noncitizen, the prospect of deportation will
almost always outweigh the connected prison term, especially if
the defendant has a family in the United States or has been in
this country so long that he no longer has a home in his native
country.107 In the case of almost any defendant, the difference
between consecutive and concurrent sentencing, or the date for
potential parole, can have a tremendous impact on the decision to
plead. These consequences, sometimes deemed “collateral,” can
greatly impact the length of imprisonment—the key “direct”
consequences.108

103

People v. Williams, 721 N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ill. 1999).
Id. (internal quotation marks ommited).
105
Bibas, supra note 98, at 1125 (internal quotation marks ommited).
106
See id. at 1131.
107
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001).
108
Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 700 (“[S]ome courts hold that counsel has
no obligation to advise his client that prison sentences may be served consecutively
rather than concurrently, even if that means, for example, that the client will serve
forty rather than twenty years.”).
104
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Critics of the direct-collateral doctrine point to the Court’s
language in Strickland to support the argument that this caseby-case approach is true to Sixth Amendment precedent.109 In
Strickland, the Court explicitly stated that a Sixth Amendment
inquiry is an inherently fact-sensitive inquiry that is not
compatible with bright-line rules.110
The direct-collateral
distinction, thus, seems wholly incompatible with Strickland.
C.

The Current Application of Padilla in Lower Courts Does Not
Fix the Existing Problems with Sixth Amendment Analysis

Though the Padilla opinion was expressly limited to
deportation, other parts of the Court’s opinion have provided a
basis for lower courts to depart from the traditional directcollateral doctrine. As a practical matter, the Court’s attempt to
limit Padilla to deportation has not limited the extension of the
opinion to other collateral consequences, but rather has limited
the guidance which the opinion gives to other courts that are
abandoning the direct-collateral doctrine.111 With this lack of
guidance, courts have taken a variety of approaches to analyzing
ineffective assistance claims based on attorney advice. However,
none of these new methods solve the issues present in the
existing direct-collateral doctrine.
1.

The “Direct Plus Deportation” Approach

The most conservative approach taken by lower courts in
applying Padilla has been to simply adhere to the old directcollateral distinction, simply using deportation as an add-on to
the direct category.112
These courts focus on the limiting
109

Id. at 712; see Roberts, supra note 63, at 694.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“In any case
presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether
counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”).
111
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
112
See, e.g., Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 352 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010), vacated,
32 A.3d 1 (Md. 2011); People v. Kabre, 29 Misc. 3d 307, 32122, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887,
899 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2010). These two lower state court decisions uphold
the direct-collateral doctrine by holding that Padilla does not apply retroactively to
pleas taken before the decision was handed down. This approach has been criticized
as an attempt to punt the issue, withholding the inevitable judgment for a later
date. See McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of
Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J.
795, 815–16 (2011). The retroactivity of the Padilla decision depends on whether the
decision announced a new rule of constitutional law or merely applied an old rule.
110
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language in the Padilla decision and generally hold that the
direct-collateral doctrine continues to apply in full force.113
Courts justify such a holding by referencing the Supreme Court’s
explicit limitation of Padilla.114 The Court went to great lengths
to demonstrate the uniqueness of deportation,115 noting that the
direct-collateral distinction was “ill-suited . . . [for] the specific
risk of deportation,”116 and expressly declined to rule on the
general applicability of the direct-collateral doctrine in other
circumstances.117
The problem with this approach is that it is too conservative.
Construing Padilla in this way does almost nothing to address
the problems with the direct-collateral doctrine.118
In
jurisdictions where deportation was already afforded Sixth
Amendment protection, this approach changes literally nothing.
In other jurisdictions, it reduces the uncertainty inherent in the
distinction only to the extent that deportation is unquestionably
included among direct consequences. Aside from the inclusion of
deportation, the definition of “direct” and “collateral” are no
clearer after Padilla than they were before the decision came
down.
2.

The “Enmeshed Consequences” Approach

Some courts and commentators have used the language in
the Padilla decision that focuses on the close connection between
a criminal conviction and deportation. These courts see a similar
connection between other traditionally collateral consequences
and hold that these consequences are entitled to Sixth
Amendment protection.119 These decisions seek to establish a
clearer and more workable definition of direct consequences.

See Consequences of Convictions After Padilla v. Kentucky: Retroactivity, CRIM.
PRAC. GUIDE, July/Aug. 2011, at 3.
113
See Miller, 11 A.3d at 352.
114
See id. at 341.
115
See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
116
Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
117
Id. at 365.
118
See supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text.
119
See Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding
that an attorney must advise his or her client of the potential of civil commitment
upon pleading guilty).
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These courts also recognize that, though the Court withheld any
general judgment on the direct-collateral doctrine, the doctrine is
on shaky ground after the Padilla decision.120
The chief danger in this approach is that of over-expansion.
It is this approach that Justice Scalia was concerned about in his
dissent, when he stated that the majority’s opinion has “no
logical stopping-point.”121
All “consequences” of a criminal
conviction, whether direct or collateral, bear some relation to the
criminal conviction by their definition as consequences.122 This
approach causes significant institutional concerns, as it can lead
toward a slippery slope, opening the floodgates to Sixth
Amendment litigation.
This approach also marginalizes the limiting language of the
Court in Padilla. This is inappropriate. The limits of the Court’s
decision should not be read as a mere exercise of judicial
restraint. Such a reading ignores that the Court went to great
length to establish the uniqueness of deportation.123 Especially
significant in the Court’s opinion is the development of
immigration law—from a largely discretionary system to a
regime of near-automatic deportation—and the former treatment
of JRAD proceedings as a direct consequence.124 These courts
also fail to recognize that the Court’s application of Strickland to
deportation was not an especially radical decision; to the extent
that an exception to the direct-collateral distinction existed
before Padilla, that exception was deportation.125
3.

The “Important Consequences” Approach

The Court in Padilla, in holding that Strickland applied,
noted that deportation was particularly severe and likely of great
importance to a noncitizen defendant.126 Other courts have
picked up on this language and have replaced the directcollateral doctrine with an analysis focused primarily on the
120

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.
Id. at 390 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122
A “consequence” is “something produced by a cause or necessarily following
from a set of conditions.” “Consequence” Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consequence (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
123
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360–64 (majority opinion).
124
Id.
125
See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 708.
126
See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365–66 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322
(2001)).
121
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importance of the consequence to the defendant. One such court
was the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Graviano, which
held that a defendant is entitled to Sixth Amendment protection
for any consequence which he can show is “of such great
importance to him that he would have made a different decision
had that consequence been disclosed.”127 This approach is readily
compatible with Strickland’s requirement that bright line rules
be avoided in Sixth Amendment claims.
However, this approach has significant problems. First, this
approach conflates the competence and prejudice prongs of
Strickland.
The competence prong is focused on attorney
behavior, not fairness to the defendant.128 By mandating that
attorneys advise their clients about any and all “sufficiently
important” consequences, this approach shifts the focus of
Strickland’s first prong to the mindset of the defendant.129 In
doing so, this approach practically eliminates the competence
prong; it would be hard to imagine a scenario where the
defendant would satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland but
would fail to show that the consequence which caused the
prejudice was not “sufficiently important” to him. There is no
rational reading of Padilla which would support this elimination
of the competence prong.
A second problem with this approach is that it handcuffs
defense counsel, taking away the wide latitude given by
Strickland’s first prong. As the Court recognized in Premo v.
Moore, a quick guilty plea can often be in the best interest of a
defendant.130 In many criminal proceedings, the prosecution’s
case is weakest at the outset of the plea bargaining stage, which
often begins before the state has had much time to build a case
against the defendant.131 At this critical point, defense counsel
may have the opportunity to extract the most favorable
disposition for his or her client.132 If defense attorneys are
constitutionally mandated to investigate all “sufficiently
important” consequences, as this approach requires, many
defendants may miss their chance at the most favorable
127
People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546, 559, 928 N.E.2d 1048, 1056, 902 N.Y.S.2d
851, 859 (2010).
128
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
129
Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d at 559, 928 N.E.2d at 1056, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
130
See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011).
131
Id.
132
Id.
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disposition. In this circumstance, it will be the time taken by the
attorney to prod for any potentially important collateral
consequence that will prejudice the defendant.
III. THE COMPETENCE PRONG AFTER PADILLA
Though some commentators have read Padilla as a “seismic”
shift in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,133 such an
interpretation ignores the great lengths the Court went to
highlight the uniqueness of deportation. Nowhere is this more
apparent than in Section I of the opinion where, before the Sixth
Amendment is mentioned, the Court detailed the unique
evolution of immigration and deportation in this country.134
Further, the seismic shift reading of Padilla blatantly disregards
the Court’s holding that “[t]he collateral versus direct distinction
is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the
specific risk of deportation.”135 Finally, the seismic shift reading
accounts for neither the decisions in lower state and federal
courts around the country,136 nor the court rules and statutes in
force in many jurisdictions,137 which have all treated deportation
differently than other collateral consequences of conviction.
The uniqueness of deportation, however, should also give
pause to anyone who reads Padilla as the Court’s endorsement of
the direct-collateral doctrine in all cases not involving
deportation. The Court went as far as it could to distance itself
from the direct-collateral doctrine without striking it down.138
The Court acknowledged the use of the doctrine in state and
lower federal courts,139 but refused to strictly apply the doctrine
in finding that deportation is “not categorically removed from the
ambit of the Sixth Amendment.”140
This Part argues that Padilla did not radically change or
expand the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. Rather, the
decision made only minor changes to existing Sixth Amendment
133

See Smyth, supra note 112, at 798.
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360–64 (2010).
135
Id. at 366 (emphasis added).
136
See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 708.
137
See id.
138
See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (“We, however, have never applied a distinction
between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally
‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland.”).
139
Id.
140
Id. at 366.
134
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doctrine. This Part argues that a proper reading of Padilla
creates a two-pronged inquiry into claims for Sixth Amendment
relief that must be satisfied before the Strickland standard can
be applied.
First, a court should determine whether the
particular consequence is “categorically removed” from Sixth
Amendment relief. If not, the court should analyze the claim
under Strickland. If the consequence is categorically removed,
however, a Sixth Amendment claim may proceed to the
Strickland test if it falls within one of two exceptions.
A.

What Consequences Are “Not Categorically Removed” from
Sixth Amendment Relief?

The Court’s analysis in Padilla makes clear that, though the
Strickland test is at the heart of a Sixth Amendment claim, it is
not the starting point of the analysis. Before the Court began its
Strickland analysis of Padilla’s claim, it first devoted a
significant portion of its opinion to determining whether
Strickland applied at all.141 The Court ultimately held that
Strickland did apply to Padilla’s claim, because deportation is
“not categorically removed” from Sixth Amendment relief.142
The Court’s holding in this section, that Strickland applies
when a consequence is “not categorically removed” from Sixth
Amendment relief, implies two things. First, the Court implies
that there are consequences of a guilty plea that are categorically
removed from “the ambit of the Sixth Amendment.”143 Second,
the Court implies that, if Strickland generally applies to
consequences which are “not categorically removed,” then, by
negative inference, Strickland generally does not apply to
consequences that are categorically removed. The question then
becomes:
What consequences, like deportation, are “not
categorically removed” from Sixth Amendment protection?
1.

Traditional Direct Consequences and Deportation Are “Not
Categorically Removed” from Sixth Amendment Protection

It is uncontroversial that the traditional “direct”
consequences—the sentence and fine stemming from a criminal
conviction144—are not categorically removed from Sixth
141
142
143
144

Id. at 365–66.
Id. at 366.
Id.
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 28, § 21.4(d).
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Amendment protection. Padilla did not question the existing
Sixth Amendment protection afforded to direct consequences; it
expanded that protection to deportation, a consequence not
traditionally thought of as “direct.”145
It is equally
uncontroversial that deportation is not categorically removed
from Sixth Amendment protection; Padilla explicitly held as
much.146
The Court found that deportation was akin to traditional
direct consequences in a number of ways, which made it difficult
to classify it as a collateral consequence.147 Though deportation
was a civil, not criminal, sanction, the Court was convinced that
a defendant was protected from deportation consequences by the
Sixth Amendment because deportation was “particularly severe”
and “intimately related to the criminal process.”148
The
entanglement of deportation and criminal convictions was the
key consideration that led the Court to apply Strickland to
Padilla’s claim.
2.

Other Consequences of Conviction Which May Be “Not
Categorically Removed” from Sixth Amendment Protection

Padilla broadened the category of consequences to which the
Strickland test applied, but the question is by how much. While
the jail sentence, the fine, and now, the deportation consequences
of conviction are clearly subject to the protection of the Sixth
Amendment, it is unclear to what else these protections apply.
This line-drawing problem was often encountered by courts
trying to apply the traditional direct-collateral doctrine.149 What
is clear, though, is that Padilla requires a line to be drawn
somewhere.150 The Court gives some guidance as to where that
145

See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.
Id. at 374.
147
Id. at 365–66.
148
Id. at 365. The Court found that deportation had been “enmeshed” with
convictions for nearly a century and was a nearly automatic consequence for a
noncitizen’s conviction. This made deportation “most difficult” to separate from the
conviction itself, both for the Court and especially for noncitizen defendants. Id. at
365–66 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322
(2001); United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
149
See United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“The
distinction between a collateral and a direct consequence of a criminal conviction,
like many of the lines drawn in legal analysis, is obvious at the extremes and often
subtle at the margin.”).
150
See supra Part III.A.
146
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line may be. To be deemed “not categorically removed” from
Sixth Amendment protection, a consequence of criminal
conviction need not technically be a “criminal sanction.”151
However, it must be so “intimately related to the criminal
process” that it is “difficult to divorce the penalty from the
conviction.”152
Consequences resulting in prolonged civil or criminal
custody may satisfy these elements.
This category of
consequences includes civil commitment, heightened sentencing
requirements for repeat offenders, availability of concurrent
rather than consecutive sentences, and timing and availability of
parole.153 These consequences have a significant impact on the
length of time the defendant is confined.154 The length of
confinement will generally be the chief factor in a defendant’s
decision to plead guilty or challenge the charges against him.155
Therefore, in order for the defendant to make a fully informed
decision regarding his plea, common sense dictates that the
defendant must be given an accurate picture regarding that
confinement. Further, because the nature of this consequence—
confinement against one’s will—is so similar to the traditional
direct consequences, it is difficult to rationalize requiring
information about these direct consequences, but not about other
methods of confinement.
3.

Courts Should Be Hesitant To Expand the Realm of
Consequences Which Are “Not Categorically Removed” from
Sixth Amendment Protection

Though some of the consequences listed above—as well as
some which are not listed—may appear to be “intimately related
to the criminal process,”156 courts should be careful in making
any expansion of the “not categorically removed” consequences.
This test must be very strictly applied because, since almost any
consequence of a criminal conviction bears some relation to the

151

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365–66.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
153
See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 705.
154
Roberts, supra note 64, at 185–86 n.278.
155
Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U.
PA. L. REV. 439, 440 (1971).
156
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365.
152
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criminal process, a liberal use of this test will swallow the effort
made by the Court to establish the uniqueness of deportation.
The question is necessarily one of degree.
The Padilla Court was particularly influenced by the high
degree to which deportation and criminal convictions had become
entangled in the last one hundred years of the country’s history.
In Section I of the Court’s opinion—before the Court even
considered the Sixth Amendment—the Court detailed the long
history of immigration and deportation in this country.157
Particularly, the Court noted the existence and elimination of the
JRAD.158
JRAD was interpreted to give the trial judge
“conclusive authority” over a convict’s deportation status; a
judge’s recommendation bound the executive branch and
prevented deportation.159 The Court noted that lower courts
deciding Sixth Amendment claims considered JRAD to be not
merely “intimately related” to the conviction, but “part of the
sentencing” itself.160 It would make little sense for deportation to
be a protected consequence when the possibility of judicial relief
existed, but unprotected once that failsafe was taken away.
It is also noteworthy that to the extent that there was an
exception to the direct-collateral rule before Padilla, that
exception was deportation.
Though some courts, like the
Supreme Court of Kentucky, ruled that deportation was a
“collateral” consequence and thus unprotected by the Sixth
Amendment,161 many other jurisdictions recognized a noncitizen’s
right to Sixth Amendment protection for possible deportation
stemming from a criminal conviction.162 This Sixth Amendment
protection was recognized through state statutes,163 court rules,164
and case law.165
The unique development of deportation as a consequence of
conviction as well as the existence of exceptions for deportation
in some jurisdictions illustrate the special circumstances under
which the Court wrote its decision. Though there are certainly
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Id. at 360–64.
Id. at 361–64.
Id. at 362 (citing Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986)).
Id. at 363–65.
See id. at 365 n.9.
See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 708.
Id. at 708 n.119.
Id.
Id. at 708.
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other consequences that are “enmeshed” with criminal
convictions, the question of whether these consequences should
be deemed “not categorically removed” from Strickland analysis
is necessarily one of degree.
B.

When Are “Categorically Removed” Consequences Subject to
the Strickland Test?

The harshness of the bright-line between categorically
removed and not categorically removed consequences can be
ameliorated through the use of two exceptions to the rule. The
first exception, the affirmative misadvice exception, is already
recognized in most jurisdictions and protects defendants when
their attorneys misstate the law.166 The second exception,
attorney knowledge plus nonadvice, extends the misadvice
protection to instances where attorneys actually or reasonably
should know the law yet remain silent.167 Further, the attorney
knowledge plus nonadvice exception cures the concern over the
incentives promoted by the affirmative misadvice exception.
1.

Affirmative Misadvice

Some lower courts in the United States have developed an
exception to the direct-collateral rule for “affirmative
misadvice.”168
These courts disregard the direct-collateral
distinction when an attorney gives his or her client “affirmative
misadvice” and will allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty
plea, or at least proceed to the prejudice prong of Strickland.169
Though the affirmative misadvice exception generally entitles
defendants to Sixth Amendment relief for collateral
consequences, there is disagreement as to when exactly the
exception applies.

166
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484–85 (Ky. 2008),
rev’d, Padilla, 559 U.S. 356.
167
See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
168
See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2002). Other courts, including the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in Padilla, refused to acknowledge this exception and
held fast to the direct-collateral distinction. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485.
169
See Roberti v. State, 782 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(“Affirmative misadvice about even a collateral consequence of a plea constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel and provides a basis on which to withdraw the
plea.”).
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The affirmative misadvice exception is controversial because
some scholars and courts see the exception as encouraging
“incompetent”—or at least discouraging “competent”—attorney
advice.170 These courts and commentators point out that the
affirmative misadvice exception incentivizes attorney silence.171
This is because the attorney who makes an effort to advise his or
her client but misstates the law in good faith will be subject to an
ineffective assistance claim while the attorney who remains
silent will not.172 Compounding this disincentive, the argument
continues, will be judges who, in the interest of ensuring the
finality of pleas, will discourage attorney advice on collateral
consequences to avoid any chance that incorrect advice would
render a plea subject to withdrawal.
The Court in Padilla recognized these concerns with the
affirmative misadvice exception. The Solicitor General, in an
amicus brief, urged the Court to limit its holding to affirmative
misadvice and not require defense counsel to provide advice on
deportation.173 The Court rejected this argument, saying that to
limit its holding to apply to only affirmative misadvice on
deportation would produce “absurd results.”174 The first absurd
result cited by the court was the incentive for attorneys “to
remain silent . . . even when answers are readily available.”175
The second absurd result was that such a limited holding would
deny noncitizens the right to any advice on deportation, even the
most basic advice available.176 To avoid these absurd results, the
Court held that, for consequences “like deportation,” attorneys
are required to provide their clients with available advice; the
failure to do so violated the competence prong of Strickland.177
It should be noted that, like the Court’s holding that
Strickland applied to Padilla’s claim, the holding regarding
misadvice came with a significant limitation: Advice was only
required for consequences “like deportation.”178 This duty to
advise, therefore, should not be generally applied. However, the
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

See Roberts, supra note 64, at 140–42.
Id.
See id. at 142.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010).
Id. at 369–70.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 370–71.
Id.
Id.
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rest of the Padilla opinion shows that this category of
consequences expands beyond those that are just “not
categorically removed.”179
2.

Attorney Knowledge Plus Nonadvice Exception

Despite whatever extra protection the affirmative misadvice
exception provides for defendants, the exception raises
significant concerns over attorney incentives. These concerns
can be adequately addressed by extending the affirmative
misadvice exception to occurrences of attorney nonadvice, if it
can be shown that the attorney knew, or should have known, that
the consequence was looming over the plea. Though there may
be concerns that a defendant, who is unlikely to record the
happenings of meetings with his attorney, will have trouble
proving actual knowledge of a consequence, Supreme Court
precedent demonstrates two ways in which knowledge may be
presumed.
The first instance where attorney knowledge may be
presumed is revealed in Padilla. In applying Strickland’s first
prong, the Court looked at the deportation statute at hand,180
which it noted was “succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the
removal consequence[s]” that Padilla was subject to.181 The
clarity of the statute, the Court found, mandated that Padilla’s
attorney give his client detailed advice.182 Because Strickland
was already held to apply to Padilla’s claim, the “succinct, clear,
and explicit” nature of the statute only determined the level of
advice an attorney was required to give his or her client.183
Though the Court in Padilla used the clarity of the relevant
statute to determine the level of advice required, a similar test
could be used to determine whether advice was required at all.
Under this test, if a defendant can show that the statute from
which the relevant consequence stems is “succinct, clear, and
explicit” in its application to the defendant and the crime he or
she is charged with, Strickland will apply to the defendant’s
claim.

179
180
181
182
183

Id. at 366.
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 368–69.
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The second instance where attorney knowledge may be
presumed is shown in Justice White’s concurrence in Hill v.
Lockhart. Though the majority decided this case under the
prejudice prong of Strickland, thereby avoiding the issue of
attorney advice,184 Justice White analyzed the case under the
competence prong, ultimately deciding that the ineffective
assistance claim based on attorney’s nonadvice in that instance
failed the competence prong because the attorney had no
knowledge that the consequence was looming.185 Justice White
determined that the attorney had no knowledge of the
consequence by referring to a “plea statement.”186 Justice White
reasoned that the plea statement, which the defendant had
reviewed for accuracy, showed the attorney’s lack of knowledge
that the consequence—in this case “second offender status”—
defeated the petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim.187 Without
knowledge that this consequence loomed, the attorney’s failure to
advise could not be said to be unreasonable, thus the claim failed
Strickland’s competence prong.188
Similar to what Justice White concluded in Hill, other
defendants can show that their attorney knew or should have
known that a consequence was looming. Indeed, the Court noted
in Padilla that the plea form used by Kentucky criminal courts
contained notice of the potential for deportation consequences.189
This second exception, based on attorney knowledge, cures
the defects inherent to the affirmative misadvice exception.
Rather than promoting attorney silence, this exception will
encourage attorneys to make a reasonable investigation into the
relevant law if they are interested in protecting the finality of
184

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985).
Id. at 60–62 (White, J., concurring).
186
Id. at 6162. The consequence at issue in Hill was heightened sentencing for
a repeat felony offender. The defendant in the case filled out, or at least reviewed, a
form in which “0” was written in the section for prior convictions. This, in the
concurring Justices’ eyes, provided proof that the defendant’s attorney had no
knowledge of the prior conviction, and thus his failure to inform the defendant of the
heightened sentencing could not be incompetent under Strickland. Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. Also, the defendant did not claim that he had told his attorney otherwise
or that he had indicated that the form had been filled out incorrectly. Id. at 61.
189
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 n.15 (2010). It is important to
remember, though, that attorney nonadvice was not at issue in Padilla; Padilla’s
attorney had affirmatively advised his client that he was not at risk of deportation.
Id. at 359. Padilla would therefore have fallen into the affirmative misadvice
exception, even if a consequence other than deportation was at issue.
185
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their guilty pleas. This is because a failure to advise about a
consequence derived from a “succinct, clear, and explicit” statute
will render the plea just as uncertain as affirmative misadvice.
The judge presiding over the plea will share this incentive and
can help to alert the defense attorney as to the consequences
which may be looming for the attorney’s client.
Incentivizing this initial investigation into the consequences
of a plea has benefits beyond the incentive itself. First, this
investigation and advice can lead to better guilty pleas. As many
courts and commentators note, the consequences formerly
deemed “collateral” may be of greater importance to a defendant
than those deemed “direct.”190 Defense attorneys, prosecutors,
and judges can use the importance of these consequences to the
defendant to negotiate creative plea agreements, where stiffer
“direct” punishments can be traded off for leniency in regard to
collateral consequences.
This would avoid circumstances like that posited in Chin and
Holmes’s “hypothetical ‘war story’ ”:
I represented someone charged with DUI, and due to my
excellent advocacy the prosecutor accepted a guilty plea with a
one-day sentence instead of the three days imposed in almost
every similar case. As an interesting aside, my client and his
family were then deported based on the conviction; I have no
idea whether I could have negotiated a deal resulting in
conviction of a non-deportable offense; status as an alien does
not affect the fine or length of incarceration, so I never
considered it. The results of this case demonstrate my
remarkable legal abilities.191

In this hypothetical, the attorney would make the initial
investigation into deportation because if he did not, and the
statute was “succinct, clear, and explicit” like in Padilla, he
would risk having the plea invalidated in a collateral proceeding.
After learning about the potential for deportation, he may have
had the chance to negotiate an agreement with the prosecutor,
where his client could offer to serve more time in prison—
perhaps a week—if the prosecutor could change the charge to a
nondeportable offense.

190
191

See Roberts, supra note 63, at 674.
See Chin & Holmes, supra note 50, at 718.
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CONCLUSION
The plea-bargaining stage is a critical point in any criminal
proceeding.192 The Supreme Court recognized this in 1985 when,
in Hill v. Lockhart, it held that the protections of the Sixth
Amendment extended to this stage.193 In recent years, as the
prevalence of guilty pleas has increased, the Court has begun to
scrutinize this phase at an unprecedented depth.194
In evaluating attorney advice during plea bargaining, the
Court came across an area rife with difficult line-drawing and
policy problems. Compounding the problem was the widely
accepted direct-collateral doctrine, which had significantly
muddied the waters of Sixth Amendment law for plea bargains.
Against this background, the Court opted to issue only a limited
decision, holding only that the direct-collateral distinction was
ill-suited for deportation. The limits on this decision must be
respected and courts should be very hesitant to impose an
overarching duty of correct affirmative advice beyond the
traditionally direct consequences, which now includes
deportation. Any extension of Sixth Amendment protection
beyond these categories should focus on attorney knowledge, so
that courts avoid conflating the competence prong of Strickland
with its separate prejudice prong.
By focusing on attorney knowledge, rather than importance
to the defendant, courts applying Strickland and Padilla can
properly respond to concerns about both institutional burdens
and fairness to individual defendants. This focus also properly
centers the competence prong analysis on attorney action, and
will incentivize diligent and efficient attorney behavior. To do
otherwise would be to take individual discretion away from
attorneys during plea bargaining—a stage when such discretion
is most needed.

192
193
194

Bibas, supra note 98, at 1118–20.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
Bibas, supra note 98, at 1118–20.

